Did Rene Guenon “convert”? In the article “Conversions”, included in the collection Initiation and Spiritual Realization, he explains that the word can be taken in two totally different senses. The first is an “intellectual metamorphosis”, an “interior transformation”, metanoia, or “change of nous” that indicates the “conscious passage of the ordinary and individual mind, normally turned toward sensible things, to its superior transposition.”
This is an interior transformation and has nothing to do with the second type which is commonly called a religious conversion. The second type is the exterior passage from one exoteric religious form to another; this type is just an exterior and contingent change. It often lacks “any real importance” and has “nothing to do with pure spirituality.” Guenon has “little regard for [such] converts in general” who are often associated with the “most exaggerated sectarianism”. Guenon claims the opposite:
Contrary to what takes place in ‘conversion’, nothing here implies the attribution of the superiority of one traditional form over another. It is merely a question of what one might call reasons of spiritual expediency, which is altogether different from simple individual preference.
Nevertheless, even the first type of conversion may be associated with an outward change of form. However, that choice is not arbitrary and there may be valid reasons for it. Guenon elucidates:
those who, for reasons of an esoteric and initiatic order, adopt a traditional form different from that to which they would seem to be linked by their origin [do this] either because their native tradition provides them with no possibility of an esoteric order, or because their chosen tradition gives them a foundation that is more appropriate to their nature, and consequently more favorable to their spiritual work.
So we see that for the elite, it is the intellectual conversion that is important. The outer form is secondary. Therefore, the various attempts to recover lost forms for their own sake or to critique living forms based solely on their exteriority are misguided. The criteria are these:
- Is the form rich and varied enough to incorporate true metaphysical teachings?
- Is the exterior form able to capture the allegiance of the general population, given their various capacities to understand?
- Does the exterior form provide a safe haven within which the elite can accomplish their tasks?
It’s remarkable the case of Ramkrishna which is mentioned by Guénon in his text. According to Guénon, all traditions transcend confessional differences and tend to merge into something unified on a deeper level. This metaphysical pluralism can be maintained only if we accept that there’s only one true Tradition or one true Religion (with the capital R) which constitutes the very essence of all traditional forms and from which all religious doctrines derive.
On the other hand, Guénon’s analysis and assessment of certain traditional forms was quite inaccurate and, as Dugin pointed out, “the very notion of ‘counter-initiation’ is inseparable from the postulation of the esoteric unity of all traditions.”
Following this postulate, it is possible to understand why Radhakrishnan for instance sought to classify various traditional forms into a categorical hierarchy.
In fact, as Kumaraswamy points out speaking of Ramkrishna and religious tolerance, “while there can be only one metaphysics, there must be not merely a variety of religions, but a hierarchy of religions, in which the truth is more or less adequately expressed, according to the intellectual capacities of those whose religions they are … it’s perfectly legitimate to feel that a given religion is more adequately true than another … ”
A jewish such as Leopold Weiss became a muslim precisely because Islam appeared to him “like a perfect work of architecture” and because it appeared to him as a living and stronger tradition.
It’s also true that within all traditional forms we find a variety of sects and doctrines. The cases of al-Hallaj and Suhrawardi who were executed as malicious heretics is emblematic to realise how a tension within the Islamicate world have always existed since immemorial times.
I must admit that there’s no concrete interest in following Guénon’s guidelines on the part of the vast majority of those who claim an affiliation to Islamic tradition and this also applies to all those who claim to follow Guénon’s teachings while falling into sectarianism and blind-following (ta’aççub).
Obviously you can’t be convinced about the truth of something you haven’t personally experienced, and this is why in my humble opinion Ramkrishna said that “only one’s own truth is true…”
For very few or none the vedic statement “only divine can worship the divine” is valid.
Imam ‘’Ali once said,
“Get to know the truth, then you would know the people of truth. Truth Is not measured by its men, but men are measured by their truth.”
It’s remarkable the case of Ramkrishna which is mentioned by Guénon in his text. According to Guénon, all traditions transcend confessional differences and tend to merge into something unified on a deeper level. This metaphysical pluralism can be maintained only if we accept that there’s only one true Tradition or one true Religion (with the capital R) which constitutes the very essence of all traditional forms and from which all religious doctrines derives.
On the other hand, Guénon’s analysis and assessment of certain traditional forms was quite inaccurate and, as Dugin pointed out, “the very notion of” counter-initiation “is inseparable from the postulation of the esoteric unity of all traditions.”
Following this postulate, it is possible to understand why Radhakrishnan for instance sought to classify various traditional forms into a categorical hierarchy.
In fact, as Kumaraswamy points out speaking of Ramkrishna and religious tolerance, “while there can be only one metaphysics, there must be not merely a variety of religions, but a hierarchy of religions, in which the truth is more or less adequately expressed, according to the intellectual capacities of those whose religions they are … it’s perfectly legitimate to feel that a given religion is more adequately true than another … ”
A jewish such as Leopold Weiss became a muslim precisely because Islam appeared to him “like a perfect work of architecture” and because it appeared to him as a living and stronger tradition.
It’s also true that within all traditional forms we find a variety of sects and doctrines. The cases of al-Hallaj and Suhrawardi who were executed as malicious heretics is emblematic to realise how a tension within the Islamicate world have always existed since immemorial times.
I must admit that there’s no concrete interest in following Guénon’s guidelines on the vast majority of those who claim an affiliation to Islamic tradition and this also applies to all those who claim to follow Guénon’s teachings while falling into sectarianism and blind-following (ta’aççub).
Obviously you can’t be convinced about the truth of something you haven’t personally experienced, and this is why in my humble opinion Ramkrishna said that “only one’s own truth is true…”
For very few or none the vedic statement “only divine can worship the divine” is valid.
Imam ‘’Ali once said,
“Get to know the truth, then you would know the people of truth. Truth Is not measured by its men, but men are measured by their truth.”
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I think the issue some take with Christianity lies in the third of your criteria. The Christian religion seems to have been the fountainhead of a large number of subversive movements – though even as I write this I can anticipate your response will be that Christianity was Judaized. Well, fair enough, but wasn’t it also paganized in an earlier period? It seems to me that what is of most value in historical Christianity is what is least essentially Christian about it.